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INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT)

(54) Title: METHOD FOR PREVENTING USE OF SOFTWARE ON AN UNAUTHORIZED COMPUTER

(57) Abstract

A method for preventing use of software on an unauthorized computer. The software is programmed to encrypt and output to the user a validation number derived from information received by the software from the computer of one or more computer characteristics providing an unchangeable and unique computer identification. A second computer is operated for the software vendor to encrypt an activation number derived from the validation number and supplied to the user for input to the user's computer. The activation number includes one or more randomly-generated digits which, when a predetermined mathematical operation is performed thereon and on at least one of the digits of the validation number, yields a derived balance number. A preselected signature and other information is randomly scattered among randomly generated bytes along with a product identification number as a thumbprint/productprint which is encrypted by the balance number derived by the user's computer from the validation and activation numbers and which is on the hard disk drive of the user's computer. The software is authorized for use in the user's computer if the preselected signature is retrieved after the predetermined balance number is applied to decrypt the information including the preselected signature.

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METHOD FOR PREVENTING
USE OF SOFTWARE ON AN UNAUTHORIZED COMPUTER

The present invention relates generally to the
prevention of unauthorized use of software. More
particularly, the present invention relates to the
preventing of a computer program from being executed on
5   a computer system or computer network, other than one
which has been previously authorized.

As computer systems and software have
proliferated, the problem of software piracy has also
increased. A computer program is typically installed in
10   a computer with a fixed disk or hard drive by
transferring the program from a floppy disk or CD-ROM
(purchased from a software publisher) to the fixed disk
for subsequent use by the computer system. While the
program may have originally been legitimately purchased,
15   the purchaser may thereafter make copies for use by the
purchaser or others in other computer systems or may
simply use the floppy disk to install the software in
other computer systems, without permission of the
software publisher, thereby depriving the software
20   publisher of the additional revenues of sale of
additional software packages to which the publisher is
entitled. Although back-up copies of software are
normally considered desirable, it is also desirable for
the financial health of the software industry that such
25   "piracy" be stopped.

Various techniques have been proposed for
elimination or reduction of software piracy. Many of
these techniques are described in U.S. patent 5,113,518
to Durst, Jr. et al, which is incorporated herein by
30   reference. Unfortunately, these techniques have met
with only limited success as procedures have been found
by the "pirates" or "hackers" for circumventing these

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techniques. Some of these techniques may also be so
inconvenient as to deter the customer from purchasing
the software. For example, one such technique utilizes
hardware in the form of a device called a "dongle" which
5   is connected to the computer, and the software must
confirm the presence of this device by means of a coded
response before it can be activated. Such a device is
described in U.S. patents 4,446,519; 4,562,306;
4,685,055; and 5,182,770. However, this undesirably
10   requires the purchase by the customer of such a device
for each new software package which is purchased.
Further, this technique can be defeated by discovery the
correct coded response and providing it through a
modification of the program.

15   As pointed out in Durst, Jr. et al, the
problem is not so much in the act of copying the
software package as it is in the use of copies of the
software on various computer systems without
compensating the publisher for the right to use those
20   copies. It is therefore a primary object of the present
invention to prevent a computer program from being
executed on an unauthorized computer system.

             Durst, Jr. et al discloses a technique for
preventing a computer program from being used by a
25   computer system other than a designated system. The
values of certain characteristics exhibited by the
designated computer system first are stored, and then
the values of those same characteristics exhibited by
the computer system which is intended to use the
30   computer program are measured and compared to the stored
values. If the compared values are substantially the
same, the computer program may be executed. However, if
they are different, the computer system which was
intended to use the program is inhibited from executing
35   that program. These characteristics are disclosed to be
one or more, and preferably at least two, of the

following: an identification of the processor included
in the computer system, the clock speed of the clock
generator included in that system, an identification of
the ROM normally provided with the processor, the wait
5   time assigned to the processor for accessing a RAM, the
actual rotary speed of a disk drive normally provided
with the computer system, the access speed of that disk
drive, and the sector interleave value of that disk
drive.

10   Inherent characteristics such as proposed in
Durst, Jr. et al have a tendency to have no current
uniqueness (although perhaps unique at one time,
standardization may have resulted in non-uniqueness, for
example, there is now a standard disk drive speed), or
15   the characteristics may change over time undesirably
making the software unavailable on the computer on which
it is originally installed. Furthermore, the values of
the characteristics are stored in the software to be
compared with the values of characteristics of a
20   computer on which the software is to be used. This has
the disadvantage of being easy to circumvent since the
values are stored in a known location in all programs,
thus being accessible to every level of programmer.

U.S. patent 4,740,890 to William discloses the
25   use of a remote computer to provide unlocking codes
derived from master lists or algorithms. In the field
of radio-frequency transmission of data, data security
has been maintained by the use of coded transmission
utilizing a pair of numbers wherein a plurality of
30   randomly-generated digits in one number has a
mathematical relationship to the other number so as to
yield a prime number for coding the transmission, and
the same prime number is used for decoding the
transmission.

35   As discussed in U.S. patent 4,319,079 to Best,
various encryption systems have been developed to

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provide data security within data processing systems.
However, computer-aided techniques for breaking codes
are becoming more sophisticated.

5   Techniques have also been proposed for
activating software remotely. For example, U.S. patent
5,222,134 to Waite et al discloses such a technique
wherein a computer is provided with a registration
shell, and a data link is established between the
computer and a registration computer. By providing the
10   registration computer with various information, a
potential licensee can register to utilize the program.
Once the registration process is complete, a
tamper-proof overlay program is constructed at the
registration computer and transferred to the user's
15   computer. The overlay includes critical portions of the
main program, without which the main program would not
operate. . This process undesirably requires a modem on
the user's computer.

U.S. patent 5,199,066 to Logan, which is
20   incorporated herein by reference, discloses a method and
system for protecting a software program recorded within
a storage medium for use with or transmission to
computer or processor based hardware. A hardware code
uniquely associated with the particular hardware and a
25   first software code uniquely associated with the
particular embodiment of the software are inputted. The
. hardware code is stated to be the numeric serial number
of the hardware upon which the program is to operate.
It is further stated that, in the case of some computers
30   and some storage media, the program may have the ability
to recall or otherwise obtain and input the software
serial number and possibly the hardware serial number
without any specific action by the user. A first
predetermined operation is performed upon the hardware
35   code and the first software code to produce an
intermediate code. A unique activation code obtained

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from the software supplier is inputted and a second predetermined operation is performed upon the intermediate code and the activation code to produce a second intermediate code. The second intermediate code

5   is compared to a second software code uniquely associated with the particular embodiment of the software and stored in a hidden location within the software. The use of the software is enabled only if the second intermediate code and the second software

10 code are identical. By a formula, the hidden software code changes each time the software is copied, for example, by the addition of 7 each time. To obtain the activation number, the user must provide to the software supplier the serial numbers of the hardware and the

15 software and the number of copies which have been made. The software supplier may have a "hot line" phone to permit the user to obtain the activation code.

        The Logan method relies on hiding a software code in a hidden location within the software. Thus,

20 this code undesirably is within access by the user to allow formulation of an activation code (without making a telephone call to legitimately obtain it) and subsequent installation of the software to be achievable if the hidden code is located and the process then

25 reverse-engineered. The hardware code which is used to generate the activation code is actually whatever number is inputted by the user and given to the supplier by the user. Since the software is not required to confirm that the activation number is based on the serial number

30 of the specific computer to be authorized, the activation code which is supplied will allow installation of the software on any computer.

        Various other techniques for preventing unauthorized software use are disclosed in U.S. patents

35 4,829,296; 4,866,769; 4,593,353; 4,683,553; 4,796,220; 5,263,157; 5,287,408; 5,311,591; and 5,293,422.

The above software-protection techniques can
either be circumvented or rely on codes that can be
broken or are so inconvenient to the customer that the
competitive position of the software publisher suffers.

5   It is accordingly an object of the present
invention to provide for authorization of a particular
computer system or network by means of a technique for
uniquely identifying the computer system or network so
that the identification doesn't change over time whereby

10   the software does not become unavailable on the
authorized computer system or network.

It is a further object of the present
invention to provide an easy and convenient means for
activation of a software package on a particular

15   computer system or network by a customer.

It is yet another object of the present
invention to provide activation of a software package on
a particular computer or computer network by means which
cannot be discovered and copied by even computer-aided

20   reverse engineering.

It is a still further object of the present
invention to provide activation of a software package on
a particular computer inexpensively and quickly.

In accordance with the present invention, a

25   method is provided for preventing use of software on an
unauthorized computer wherein the software is programmed
to generate and output to the user of a computer a first
or validation number derived from one or more of the
following computer characteristics: serial number of

30   the hard disk, the BIOS data from ROM, the number of
sectors per track of the hard disk, the number of heads
of the hard disk, and the number of cylinders of the
hard disk. A second or activation number derived from
the first number is encrypted by operation of a second

35   computer at a remote location inaccessible to the user
for input to the user's computer to allow use of the

software on the user's computer. The second number includes one or more randomly generated digits which, when a predetermined mathematical operation is performed thereon and on at least one of the digits of the

5   validation number, yields a derived balance number. This derived balance number is used in the user's computer to encrypt a thumbprint of the computer characteristic including a preselected signature and a productprint. When the computer program is to be

10   executed, the software decodes the thumbprint and productprint using a predetermined balance number. If the derived balance number is equal to the predetermined balance number, the program will execute. Otherwise, it will not execute.

15   The above and other objects, features, and advantages of the present invention will be apparent in the following detailed description of the preferred embodiments thereof taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings wherein the same reference

20   numerals denote the same or similar parts throughout the several views.

Brief Description of the Drawings
             Fig. 1 is a perspective view of a personal

25   computer and a floppy disk within which is stored a computer program wherein the computer is to be authorized for use of the program therein in accordance with the present invention.
             Fig. 2 is a generally diagrammatic view

30   illustrating the hard disk drive therefor.
             Fig. 3 is a generally diagrammatic view illustrating the software activation process which embodies the present invention.
             Fig. 4 is a block diagram of the process.

35   Fig. 5 is a flow diagram therefor.

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Fig. 6 is a flow diagram of a process for generating a validation number therefor.

Fig. 7 is a flow diagram of a process for generating from the validation number an activation
5   number.

Fig. 8 is a flow diagram for execution of the software.

Fig. 9 is a flow diagram of the entering of the activation number by the user.
10   Fig. 10 is a flow diagram of generation of a thumbprint in the computer.

Fig. 11 is a diagrammatic view illustrating the thumbprint format in the computer.

Fig. 12 is a view similar to that of Fig. 11
15   illustrating the productprint format in the computer.

Fig. 13 is a diagrammatic view of the thumbprint/productprint areas illustrating scrambling of the thumbprint.

Fig. 14 is an enlarged view of the thumbprint
20   area of Fig. 13.

Fig. 15 is a view similar to that of Fig. 3 illustrating an alternative embodiment to the present invention.

Fig. 16 is a flow diagram similar to that of
25   Fig. 6 illustrating an alternative method of generating the validation number.

Fig. 17 is a flow diagram similar to that of Fig. 7 illustrating an alternative method of generating the activation number.

30

Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments

Referring to the drawings, there is shown in Fig. 1 a typical personal computer 10 of a type well known in the art and commercially available from a
35   variety of manufacturers, for example, IBM Corporation. The personal computer 10 includes a standard keyboard

12, a standard cathode ray tube (CRT) or screen 14, and
a pair of floppy disk drives 16. The keyboard 12 is
employed to facilitate communication between an
individual user, illustrated at 40 in Fig. 3, and the
5   computer 10 in a manner which is generally well known in
the computer art. The CRT 14 also functions in a manner
well known in the computer art for displaying
information inputted through the keyboard 12 as well as
information outputted by the inner workings of the
10   computer 10. The disk drives 16 are employed in a
manner well known in the computer art for receiving one
or more floppy disks to facilitate the loading or entry
of computer software or programs stored within a floppy
disk into the computer 10. A typical floppy disk 18 is
15   illustrated in Fig. 1. As used herein, the terms,
"program," "computer program," "software" and "software
program" are interchangeably used to mean a series of
instructions which are used to control the operation of
computer hardware or other computer-based or
20   process-based hardware. The reference numeral 18 will
be used herein to refer interchangeably to the floppy
disk as well as the program contained thereon.
          While in the present description of a
preferred embodiment of the invention, a personal
25   computer 10 is shown and described, it will be
appreciated by those skilled in the art that the present
invention may be employed in conjunction with any other
type of computer, including standard computers such as a
microcomputer, a mini-computer, a main-frame computer, a
30   computer network, and/or special purpose computers. In
addition, the present invention may be employed in
connection with any other type of computer or
processor-based hardware such as computer or processor
controlled machinery or equipment. By "computer
35   network" is meant a plurality of computers which

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communicate via a client server, peer-to-peer, or the
like.

  Likewise, while in connection with the
description of the presently preferred embodiment, the
5 computer program or software is illustrated as being
stored within a floppy disk 18, it will be appreciated
by those skilled in the art that the program or software
could alternatively be stored in any other type of
storage medium, for example, a different magnetic
10 medium, such as a CD-ROM drive, a hard disk drive,
magnetic tape, etc.; a semiconductor based storage
medium, such as a random access memory (RAM), a read
only memory (ROM), a programmable read only memory
(PROM), etc.; or a nontraditional storage medium, such
15 as a digital audio or video tape or disk or network of
storage devices. Accordingly, it should be clearly
understood that the present invention is not limited to
the particular computer hardware 10 or storage medium 18
used to illustrate the preferred embodiment of the
20 invention.

  Referring to Fig. 2, there is illustrated at
20 a fixed or hard disk drive for computer 10 which
includes a multiplicity of platters 22 rotatable about a
hub 24. Each platter 22 contains a plurality of
25 concentric circular tracks 26 each containing a
plurality of sectors 28 used for storage of digital
information. Although there are physically fewer
sectors 28 in the tracks 26 closer to the hub 24, the
hard drive controller, illustrated at 32, manages the
30 space so that, as seen by the computer 10, there are on
average typically 17 sectors 28 per track 26. Each
platter 22 is two-sided and has on each side a
read/write head 30 which magnetically stores onto and
reads digital information from the platter 22.

35   For a track 26, there is a similarly situated
track on the opposite side of its platter 22 and on each

of the sides of the other platters, which multiplicity
of tracks together is defined herein as a cylinder,
illustrated at 34. A cylinder 34 is a logical ordering
so that the controller 32 can simultaneously write to
5   both sides of each of a multiplicity of platters 22.

Referring to Figs. 3 and 4, in accordance with
the present invention, when a purchaser 40 of a
publisher's software package 18 wishes to use the
software on the computer 10, the software requires that
10   it first be authorized. The software 18 is embedded
with a program which prevents use of the software (or
copies thereof) on a computer unless authorization is
obtained for use on the particular computer. In a
computer network, a maximum number of concurrent users
15   may be authorized for use of the software, as described
hereinafter.

The program 18 encrypts from one or more
computer characteristics, as indicated at 42, a first or
validation number, as indicated at 44, which appears on
20   the computer screen along with instructions for
obtaining a second or activation number for inputting to
the computer 10, as indicated at 46, for executing the
software 18, as indicated at 48.

In order that there be minimal inconvenience
25   to the user 40, he or she is preferably instructed to
call an "800" or the like phone number at an activation
center, illustrated at 61, at another location (remote
location) which is provided as a service to the
publisher of the software 18. Thus, phones 52 and 54
30   respectively are used to orally communicate the
validation number (and other information to be described
hereinafter) over phone line 56 to the activation center
operator 50 who then inputs via keyboard 58 the
validation number to a second computer 60, which may be
35   similar to computer 10 or another suitable conventional
computer. This number is then used by the program 63 in

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computer 60 to generate and encrypt an activation
number, as indicated at 62.   The reference numeral 63
refers to a hard disk drive in computer 60 as well as a
program stored thereon.   The activation number is

5   generated to be related to the validation number so that
a number, herein called a "derived balance number," may
be derived therefrom, as hereinafter discussed.   The
activation number is then provided by the operator 50 to
the user 40 over phone line 56, who then inputs it to

10   computer 10 by means of keyboard 12.   The software
program 18 then utilizes the validation and activation
numbers, as indicated at 64, to obtain the derived
balance number.   If the validation and activation
numbers have been correctly generated and inputted to

15   the user's computer, the derived balance number will be
equal to a predetermined balance number.   This derived
balance number is then used to encrypt a thumbprint of
the computer characteristics including a preselected
signature (TP) and a productprint (PP), as indicated at

20   65.   For the software to be executed, as indicated at
124, the program is loaded to the hard disk 20, as
indicated at 120, and the thumbprint and productprint
are decrypted using the predetermined balance number, as
indicated at 67.   It is envisioned that, with CD-ROM or

25   some other medium, the software program may not be
loaded to the hard disk.   If the preselected signature
is retrieved, the program 18 proceeds with execution of
the software, as indicated at 48.
                    As used herein and in the claims, a

30   "predetermined balance number" is a number which is
embedded in the software 18 or otherwise provided to
decrypt the preselected signature, and a "derived
balance number" is a number which is derived
mathematically from the validation and activation

35   numbers for encrypting the signature.   As used herein
and in the claims, a "signature" or "preselected

signature" is information in the form of a preselected
set of digits or characters which the software 18 is
programmed to recognize or locate upon use of a
decryption process using the predetermined balance
5   number in order that the software be authorized for use.
Therefore, if the derived balance number is the same as
the predetermined balance number, the signature will be
correctly encrypted and can as a result be decrypted by
the predetermined balance number to yield the
10   preselected signature whereby the program may be
executed.   Otherwise, the preselected signature cannot
be found and the program will not execute.

Referring to Fig. 15, there is illustrated an
alternative embodiment wherein person-to-person phone
15   communication over telephone line 56 is replaced by
modem-to-modem communication. Thus, modems 53 and 55
may be provided for computers 10 and 60 respectively for
transmitting and receiving the needed information.

Fig. 5 illustrates in greater detail at 65 the
20   process for activation of the software 18. As
illustrated therein, the user 40 begins the process by
inserting the diskette or CD-ROM or the like containing
the software 18 in the respective drive 16.
Alternatively, the user may have previously down-loaded
25   (by modem) an embedded software package from a computer
bulletin board service or other electronic distribution
service. In this case, the software will be residing on
the hard disk drive, awaiting activation. In all cases,
the user selects the "activate" or "install" option.
30   The software application code then checks for previous
activation of this software package 18 on this
particular computer system 10, i.e., is there a valid
thumbprint/productprint (TP/PP) for this product. If
"yes," the program may proceed with installation or re-
35   installation of the software 18 without a call to the
activation center. If "no," a first screen appears

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which greets the user 40 in the publisher's name and
prompts the user to exit or to proceed with software
activation.

5   If the user elects to proceed with software
activation, the application code reads the system
characteristics, which will be discussed hereinafter,
and a second screen appears showing the publisher's
name, product and version, customer identification, and
product identification. The user is then requested to
10   enter the publisher's product serial number after which
it is validated for transcription errors. The user is
requested to have basic demographic information
available before making a "1-800," "1-900," "DDD," or
the like telephone call to the activation center 61 and
15   is then requested to call the activation center 61.

At the activation center 61, the operator 50
requests the customer's identification number, the
product identification number, and published product
serial number and displays the customer screen. The
20   operator then receives and enters this information in
the activation center computer 60. The last two digits
of each of these numbers are check digits, determined in
accordance with principles commonly known in the art to
which this invention pertains, by means of which the
25   program 63 checks whether the numbers are valid numbers.
The operator may then receive and enter demographic
.   information from a new customer or updated demographic
information from an existing customer. The program 18
then proceeds to generate from the system
30   characteristics a validation number which then appears
on the screen. The operator 50 then requests and enters
.   the validation number in the activation center computer
60, and the program 63 in the activation center computer
proceeds to generate an activation number, as described
35   hereinafter. This activation number is then relayed by
phone from the operator 50 to the user 40, who then

enters the information in computer 10. As previously
discussed, this information may alternatively be
transmitted back and forth by modem-to-modem
communication. After deriving the balance number, the
5   program 18 then "writes" the product identification, the
computer characteristics, and the preselected signature
in the form of a thumbprint/productprint (TP/PP)
encrypted by the derived balance number, as described
hereinafter, to the hard disk drive 20. If the
10   activation number is not a correct number to generate a
derived balance number which is the same as the
predetermined balance number, then the TP/PP will be
encrypted and written using a different number, and the
preselected signature will not be found when
15   subsequently applying the decryption process using the
predetermined balance number. As a result, future
efforts to execute previously authorized computer
programs on this computer system will be unsuccessful.
The screen will then prompt the user to proceed with
20   installation of the computer program or to exit. If the
user selects "proceed", the publisher package
installation proceeds, and, when complete, the user
system returns to the operating system prompt.

If the system characteristics on which the
25   validation number is based have a tendency to change
over time or are not sufficiently unique, as are the
characteristics disclosed in the Durst, Jr. et al
patent, then authorization of a computer may be
unreliable in that the authorization may be lost if the
30   characteristics change or the software may not reliably
be prevented from use on an unauthorized computer
system. Thus, the characteristics of the computer
system on which the validation number is based are
chosen to be unique and unchanging so that subsequent
35   program execution on the same computer system is
seamless yet attempts to execute the program on a

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different computer system will result reliably in the
program being prevented from executing without a further
authorization from the activation center. A suitable
set of computer characteristics (32 bytes), which are
5   available on standard industry hardware by accessing
various interrupts and direct read functions in "C"
language, using principles commonly known to those of
ordinary skill in the art to which this invention
pertains, are the serial number of the hard disk 20 (20
10   bytes), the BIOS data from ROM (read only memory), i.e.,
the date (MM/DD/YY) the system board for computer 10 was
manufactured (8 bytes), and disk information consisting
of the number of sectors 28 per track 26 (1 byte), the
number of heads 30 (1 byte), and the number of cylinders
15   34 (2 bytes). It should be understood that the set of
characteristics may be less than the above as long as
the desired uniqueness is obtained. For example, the
serial number of the hard disk 20, which includes a
unique manufacturer identification number, may be
20   sufficient. For another example, the combination of the
BIOS data and the hard disk information may be
sufficient.

Hereinafter, specific processes for generation
of the validation and activation numbers, along with
25   examples, will be provided. It should be understood
that various variations may be made in these specific
processes. Thus, neither the specific process steps nor
the examples should be viewed as limiting the present
invention but are instead to be taken as exemplary
30   thereof.

Referring to Fig. 6, after the program 18
retrieves internal characteristic information, as
indicated at 70, these 32 bytes of information are
reduced to 4 internal random bytes (for example, A.!Ø),
35   as indicated at 72, by the conventional technique of a
recursive modulus 256 check-sum procedure, a technique

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commonly known to those of ordinary skill in the art to
which this invention pertains. Each of the four bytes
correspond to numbers between 0 and 255, for example,
61, 128, 85, 40. The reduction in the number of bytes
5   is primarily to reduce the volume of information to be
transmitted over the phone by the user and operator.
However, with modem-to-modem communication, as
previously discussed relative to Fig. 15, it may be
unnecessary to reduce the 32 bytes to 4 since
10   convenience of the user and operation would no longer be
a consideration.

As indicated at 74, 5 check digits are
calculated from these four bytes by a conventional
weighted technique wherein the summation of the products
15   of the bytes and weighted numbers, using the weighting
2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively, is divided by 10, and the
remainder is the first check digit D_1. Thus, $D_1 = 2$ as
follows:

20
$$[5(61)+4(128)+3(85)+2(40)]/10$$
$$= 115, \text{ remainder } 2$$

Check digit D_1 is appended to the four bytes, i.e., 61,
25   128, 85, 40, 2, for calculation of check digit D_2, and
the summation of the products of the bytes (with D_1) and
numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (shifted to the right)
respectively is divided again by 10, and the remainder
is the second check digit D_2. Thus, $D_2 = 0$ as follows:

30
$$[6(61)+5(128)+4(85)+3(40)+2(2)]/10$$
$$= 147, \text{ remainder } 0$$

35   The remaining check digits D_3, D_4, and D_5 may be
calculated similarly with "shifting to the right"
occurring for each check digit. As illustrated at 76,
these check digits are placed in an intermediate storage

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buffer to await the generation of 5 random digits, as
hereinafter discussed.

Meanwhile, as indicated at 78, the program 18
generates the 5 random digits R_1 to R_5. As indicated at
80, these random digits R_1 to R_5 are added respectively
to the check digits D_1 to D_5 (and any resulting digit in
the 10s column dropped) to obtain a set of digits C_1 to
C_5. For example, assuming D_1 to D_5 = 3, 5, 1, 9, 2, and
R_1 to R_5 = 8, 3, 6, 2, 5, C_1 to C_5 are calculated as
follows:

3	5	1	9	2	D_1 to D_5
8	3	6	2	5	R_1 to R_5
1	8	7	1	7	C_1 to C_5

As indicated at 82, the digits C_1 to C_5 and the
random digits R_1 to R_5 are assembled as $R_1 \ldots R_5$, $C_1 \ldots C_5$,
i.e.,

8   3   6   2   5   1   8   7   1   7

As indicated at 84, two check digits C_6 and C_7
are calculated similarly as discussed for check digits D_1
to D_5. Thus, C_6 is calculated by summing the products of
the 10 digits and 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 2, 3
respectively and dividing by 10, the remainder being C_6
which, in this example, is 6, as follows:

$$[2(7)+3(1)+4(7)+5(8)+6(1)+7(5)+8(2)+9(6)+2(3)+3(8)]/10 = 22, \text{ remainder 6.}$$

Using the resulting 11 digit number and shifting to the
right, check digit C_7 = 8, as follows:

$$[2(6)+3(7)+4(1)+5(7)+6(8)+7(1)+8(5)+9(2)+2(6)+3(3) +4(8)]/10 = 23, \text{ remainder 8.}$$

As indicated at 86, random numbers R_1 to R_5, digits C_1 to C_5, and the check digits C_6 and C_7 are assembled into the validation number $R_1 \ldots R_5$, $C_1 \ldots C_5$, C_6, C_7 which, in the example, is:

5
        Validation no: 8 3 6 2 5 1 8 7 1 7 6
8

10   Thus, the resulting pseudo-random validation number generated by the program 18 in the user's computer 10 comprises digits which are meaningless to the user and have no meaning relative to the computer characteristics, except that the computer
15   characteristics can be derived therefrom by means of a program which traces backwardly the validation code to the original 32 bytes. Since the process is pseudo-random, the derivation of such a program by a hacker is not envisioned. By re-calculation of check digits C_6 and
20   C_7, the activation computer 60 can confirm that the validation number provided by the user 40 is a correct and not a fabricated or incorrectly given validation number.

      Referring to Fig. 16, there is illustrated an
25   alternative method of generating the validation number which allows the authenticity of the customer and product identification and the product serial no. to be checked for relational correctness and whether the information given over the phone corresponds to what is
30   entered in the computer 10. Often, the product identification and product serial numbers are within a range of numbers, permitting a further check on their correctness.

      As indicated at 200, the customer and product
35   identification numbers, the publisher's serial number, and the preliminary validation number (including check digits) are first assembled into a number (customer

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ID....C_7), the preliminary validation number in this
embodiment being defined to be the same as the 12-digit
validation number previously discussed. This assembled
number is then used to generate from all of the bytes
5   thereof two check digits C_8 and C_9, as indicated at 202,
in a manner as previously discussed for generation of
check digits. As indicated at 204, the resulting number
with these check digits appended (customer ID....C_9) is
then summed. Two more check digits C_{10} and C_{11} are then
10   generated based on the sum, as indicated at 206, again
using similar principles for check digit generation.
The check digits C_8, C_9, C_{10}, and C_{11} are appended to the
preliminary validation number to obtain a final
validation number ($R_1...R_5$, $C_1....C_{11}$), as indicated at
15   208.

At the activation center, the check digits C_8
to C_{11} will be used to determine if the information given
by the user checks, i.e., the activation center will
double-check to determine if the user really gave the
20   correct information.

Unless otherwise noted, the term "validation
number" will refer in this specification to the 12-digit
validation number but may refer in the claims to either
validation number or another suitable validation number.
25   Referring to Fig. 7, there is indicated the
process of generation of the nine digit activation
number A_1 to A_9 by program 63 in the remote activation
computer 60. As indicated at 90, after the validation
number is inputted, the check digits C_6 and C_7 are re-
30   calculated and compared with the corresponding digits in
the validation number as supplied over the phone by the
user to confirm the validation number as a correct one
which has not been fabricated or incorrectly given by
the user.

35   As indicated at 92, the sum of the digits of
the validation number is calculated, this sum being a

number which is defined herein as "Balance 1." Thus, in
this example,

$$\text{Balance } 1 = 8+3+6+2+5+1+8+7+1+7+6+8 = 62$$

It should however be understood that Balance 1 may be
obtained from the validation number by any other
suitable mathematical process.

As indicated at 94, digits A_2, A_6, and A_7 are
calculated from the validation number as follows. A_2 is
set equal to the unit's value of balance 1, and A_6 is set
equal to the ten's value thereof. Thus, in the example,
$A_2 = 2$ and $A_6 = 6$. The digits $R_1 \ldots R_5$, $C_1 \ldots C_5$ are
multiplied respectively by 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128,
256, 512 (hexadecimal weighting, i.e., the digits being
multiplied respectively by a set of numbers with each
being double the preceding number, beginning with 1),
and the summation of the products is divided by 10, the
remainder being A_7. Thus, $A_7 = 4$, calculated as follows:

$$[1(8)+2(3)+4(6)+8(2)+16(5)+32(1)+64(8)+128(7)$$
$$+256(1)+512(7)]/10 = 541, \text{ remainder } 4$$

As indicated at 96, three random digits a, b,
and c are generated by the program 63. A number d is
calculated as a(b)+c, as indicated at 98. As indicated
at 100, if d is greater than or equal to a predetermined
balance number, d is subtracted from Balance 1,
giving e. Otherwise, d is added to Balance 1, giving e.
As indicated at 102, if the result e is not equal to the
predetermined balance number, a new set of 3 random
digits is generated and steps 96, 98, and 100 re-applied
until a set of 3 digits a, b, and c is randomly selected
such that e is equal to the predetermined balance
number. The number d for those three digits (wherein, e
= the predetermined balance number) is defined herein as
"Balance 2," and those three digits a, b, and c are set

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equal to A_3, A_1, and A_5 respectively, as indicated at 104.
It should be understood that Balance 2 may be obtained
from the three (or other suitable number) of
randomly-generated digits by any other suitable

5   mathematical process. Thus, Balance 2, in this example,
is equal to Balance 1 less the predetermined balance
number, i.e., Balance 2 = 62 - 5 = 57.

It is preferred that the predetermined balance
number be a prime number such as, in the example, 5,

10 since a factorable number is weak mathematically so that
the code may be more easily cracked. More preferably,
the prime number is a higher number such as a 2, 3, or 4
digit prime number since more digits of information are
involved, making any effort to determine the

15 predetermined balance number even more difficult.

With e = 5, a random set of values for a, b,
and c may be 7, 8, and 1 respectively whereby A_1, A_3, and
A_5 are 8, 7, and 1 respectively. This is because
Balance 2 = 7(8) + 1 = 57, and

20 e = Balance 1 - Balance 2 = 62 - 57 = 5.

As indicated at 106, a determination is made
whether Balance 1 is greater than or equal to the
predetermined balance number e. If Balance 1 is less
than the predetermined balance number, 5, then A_4 is set

25 to a random number of 0 to 4, as indicated at 108. If
Balance 1 is greater than or equal to the predetermined
balance number, 5, as it is in the example, then A_4 is
set to a random number of 5 to 9. For example, A_4 may be
set randomly to 6.

30 As indicated at 112, the digits A_1 to A_7 are
then assembled, as follows:

8   2   7   6   1   6   4

35
Similarly as check digits C_6 and C_7 were
calculated for the validation number, check digits A_8 and

A_9 are calculated for the activation number, as indicated
at 114, except the multipliers of A_1 to A_7 and then A_1 to
A_8 begin with different digits, i.e., 7 and 8
respectively. Thus, in the example, $A_8 = 6$ as follows:

$$[7(4)+8(6)+9(1)+2(6)+3(7)+4(2)+5(8)]/10$$
$$= 16, \text{ remainder } 6$$

$A_9=6$ as follows:

$$[8(6)+9(4)+2(6)+3(1)+4(6)+5(7)+6(2)+7(8)]/10$$
$$= 22, \text{ remainder } 6$$

As illustrated at 116, the activation number A_1
to A_9 is assembled and displayed on the screen to the
operator 50, as follows:

8   2   7   6   1   6   4   6   6

This number is delivered over the phone, by modem, or
otherwise to the user for inputting to computer 10.
Referring to Fig. 17, there is illustrated an
alternative method of generating the activation number,
which allows a greater check on the authenticity of the
digits thereof. After assembly of the preliminary
activation number, as illustrated in Fig. 7 and
indicated at 116, this assembled number is then used to
generate from all of the bytes thereof two check digits
A_{10} and A_{11}, as indicated at 250, in a manner as
previously discussed for generation of check digits. As
indicated at 252, the resulting number with these check
digits appended $(A_1....A_{11})$ is then summed. Two more
check digits A_{12} and A_{13} are then generated based on the
sum, as indicated at 254, again using similar principles
for check digit generation. The check digits A_{10}, A_{11},
A_{12}, and A_{13} are appended to the preliminary activation
number to obtain a final activation number, as indicated

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at 256. When the final activation number is inputted to
the user's computer, the program will utilize these
additional check digits to determine if the activation
number is a correctly generated number.

5   Unless otherwise noted, the term "activation
number" will refer in this specification to the nine-
digit activation number but may refer in the claims to
either activation number or another suitable activation
number.

10   As with the validation number, the resulting
pseudo-random activation number generated by the program
63 in the remote computer 60 comprises digits which are
meaningless to the user and have no meaning relative to
the validation number, which is also meaningless to the

15   user. If, however, the user were to successfully
generate an activation number which would cause the
TP/PP to be encrypted and written, the TP/PP cannot
thereafter be decrypted to retrieve the preselected
signature for execution of the software unless the

20   random digits were also selected to give a derived
balance number which is the same as the predetermined
balance number.

        The activation number is given over the phone,
modem, or the like to the user 40 and inputted to the

25   computer 10 being authorized. The program 18 then
generates a derived balance number and causes the
customer and product identification, computer system
unique characteristics, and the preselected signature to
be written on the hard disk drive 20 as the

30   thumbprint/productprint (TP/PP), encrypted by use of the
derived balance number, as described hereinafter,
preferably in several locations to facilitate data
integrity/recovery across all operating systems, i.e.,
DOS, Windows, OS/2, and the like: (1) one or more

35   locations in the root of the hard disk drive 20, i.e. a
non-hidden file in the directory, (2) track 0 of the

first cylinder 34, i.e., a hidden file, and (3) several
(perhaps 3) locations on the diagnostic cylinder, i.e.
hidden files. By "hidden files" is meant that there is
no directory in the system which indicates their

5   existence. The information is also written to several
different locations as a back-up, i.e., in case it gets
inadvertently deleted at one or more locations. There
are situations where it may be desirable to recover the
information. For example, during unloading and

10   reloading, the "non-hidden file" and its root directory
will be recovered, i.e., rewritten. Therefore, it is
desirable that the information be written to the root
directory even though it is not a hidden file.

         Referring to Fig. 8, for execution of the

15   software package 18, the user "runs" the software, as
indicated at 120, and the "executable" code portion
thereof checks for whether a valid
thumbprint/productprint (TP/PP) exists on the hard disk
drive 20, as indicated at 122. If a valid TP/PP has

20   been written to the hard disk drive 20, the software
executes, as indicated at 124. A wrapper in each
software package may have several "enabling" function
calls to the embedded, encrypted "code." However, if a
valid TP/PP does not exist, then the software causes the

25   computer screen to display a message prompting the user
to insert the activation/installation diskette, CD ROM,
or the like medium in order to activate, as indicated at
126. If the medium is inserted, the activation process
begins, as indicated at 128. Otherwise, the program

30   terminates and a return to the Operating System occurs.

         Referring to Fig. 9, after the activation
number A_1 to A_9 is inputted to the computer 10 by the
user 40, as indicated at 130, check digits A'_8 and A'_9 are
calculated (in the same way check digits A_8 and A_9 were

35   calculated) and compared with digits A_8 and A_9, as
indicated at 132 and 134 respectively. If $A_8 = A'_8$ and

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$A_9 = A^1_9$, then the program proceeds to a calculation of
A^1_2, A^1_6, and A^1_7 (in the same way A_2, A_6, and A_7 were
calculated) and a comparison made with A_2, A_6, and A_7, as
indicated at 136 and 138 respectively. If $A_2 = A^1_2$,

5      $A_6 = A^1_6$, and $A_7 = A^1_7$, then A_1, A_3, and A_5 are extracted
from the activation number, Balance 1 is set equal to
the sum of the digits of the validation number, and
Balance 2 is set equal to $A_3(A_1) + A_5$, as indicated at
140, 142, and 144 respectively. A_4 is abstracted from

10   the validation number. If A_4 is greater than or equal to
5, then the derived balance number is equal to Balance 1
less Balance 2, as indicated at 146. Otherwise, the
derived balance number is equal to the sum of Balance 1
and Balance 2, as indicated at 148.

15   Referring to Figs. 10 to 14, the derived
balance number is used to encrypt and write to the hard
disk drive 20 the thumbprint in a thumbprint format,
indicated at 209 in Fig. 11, and the productprint
(containing the publisher's product identification

20   number in a productprint format), illustrated at 221 in
Fig. 12, contained within a cluster of perhaps 4 sectors
28 (2048 bytes), as seen in Fig. 13. The thumbprint 150
is contained within one of the sectors (512 bytes).

          As indicated at 160 in Fig. 10, the program

25   first checks for whether a thumbprint 150 exists. If it
does, it is then updated for a new productprint, as
indicated at 161, and a random number generator is run
to determine randomly a "pointer" start position, as
indicated at 163. If it doesn't, a thumbprint 150 must

30   be generated. This is done by running a unique random
number generator for the "pointer" portion 154 (right
side 256 bytes) of the thumbprint area 150, as indicated
at 162, running a non-unique random number generator for
the "data" portion (left side 256 bytes) of the

35   thumbprint area 150 and the 3 sectors for productprints,
as indicated at 164, and running a random number

generator to determine randomly a "pointer" start
position, as indicated at 166.

Referring to Fig. 11, the thumbprint is
assembled in the area 150 in a format, indicated at 209,
5   of perhaps 35 bytes including (1) the authorizer's
signature (16 bytes), illustrated at 226, (2) the
customer identification number (4 bytes), illustrated at
210, (3) the number of products for this customer number
(2 bytes, based on how many productprints have been
10   written), illustrated at 212, (4) a productprint
encryption key (2 bytes, a random number used to encrypt
the productprint by a suitable conventional process),
illustrated at 214, (5) the 4-byte internal machine
characteristic data, illustrated at 216, (6) four
15   pointers (1 byte each), illustrated at 218, used for
recovery of the TP/PP in track zero since they identify
4 particular sectors previously allocated by the
operating system therefor, and (6) a check sum (3
bytes), i.e., which is derived by the modulus 256
20   process as previously discussed, illustrated at 220.

Referring to Fig. 12, the productprint,
encrypted by encryption key 214 and then XOR'd to
reverse bits in accordance with principles commonly
known to those of ordinary skill in the art to which
25   this invention pertains, is assembled in the area 152 in
a format, illustrated at 221, of perhaps 11 bytes
including (1) product identification (2 bytes),
illustrated at 222, (2) "try & buy" indicators (3
bytes), illustrated at 223, (3) network indicators (3
30   bytes), illustrated at 224, and (4) a check sum (3
bytes), illustrated at 225. The "try & buy" and
"network" indicators 223 and 224 respectively will be
discussed hereinafter. It should be understood that
these indicators 223 and 224 are optional and need not
35   be provided if the software package is not to have these
features.

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In order to determine if a software program is
authorized or "maximum" users in a network are exceeded,
the embedded software about to execute on a "node" is
programmed to communicate back to the client server or
5   peer-to-peer node to obtain authorization prior to
executing. Character 6 in the "network" indicator 224
is a "type of network" designator, i.e., perhaps using
the characters "N" for Novell, "B" for Banyan, "W" for
Windows, "L" for Lantastic, and "A" for "not
10   applicable." Characters 7 and 8 contain the maximum
number of users allowed concurrently. If character 6 is
"A" or another character indicating that the software
contains no provision for network use, then characters 7
and 8 are random digits.

15   The thumbprint 209 also contains the
preselected signature (16 bytes), illustrated at 226,
which is a set of characters which are the same for each
item of software 18. The preselected signature 226 may
be determined randomly or in any other suitable way.
20   For example, the signature may be generated by beginning
with 28 and adding 91 (if the sum is greater than 255,
then 255 is subtracted to get the number) until the 16
characters are generated. It is this signature which
must be retrieved by the program 18 before execution of
25   the software is permitted.

Referring to Figs. 13 and 14, the numbers
generated in the pointer portion 154 of 256 bytes are
random and unique, i.e., each number appears only once.
Thus, in the example of Fig. 12, the first 6 bytes
30   randomly contain unique numbers 56, 1, 14, 255, 48, and
4. A start-point byte is randomly selected, for
example, at the third byte, indicated at 158, containing
the number 14.

The 35 (or more) bytes of the thumbprint 209
35   are scrambled or randomly scattered in the "data"
portion 156 as controlled by the "pointer" portion 154.

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Thus, to assemble the thumbprint data, as indicated at
168, the start-point byte 158 determines the byte-
position of the first byte of the thumbprint, i.e., byte
number 14 in the "data" portion. The next pointer byte
5   containing number 255 determines the byte-position of
the second byte of the thumbprint, i.e., data portion
byte number 255. The locations of the remaining
thumbprint bytes are determined similarly, and the
remaining or unused bytes in the "data" portion retain
10   their randomly-generated numbers.

The program 18 proceeds to decompose the
validation and activation numbers and obtain a derived
balance number, as previously discussed relative to Fig.
9, which is used to encrypt the TP/PP, as illustrated at
15   174, by any suitable encryption method. For example,
each encrypted byte may be used to encrypt the next byte
in a ripple effect.

After the thumbprint is assembled or updated,
the productprint data is assembled, as indicated at 170.
20   New check sums are calculated and stored for the TP, PP,
and cluster, as indicated at 172, followed by encrypting
the PP with the randomly generated number in the TP
(then XOR'd) and the TP/PP with the derived balance
number, as indicated at 174. It is this encrypted TP/PP
25   which is then written to the hard disk drive 20, as
indicated at 176.

For execution of the software 18, the program
effects decryption using the predetermined balance
number. If the predetermined balance number is the same
30   as the derived balance number (meaning that the
validation and activation number set was correctly
decomposable to yield a derived balance number which is
equal to the predetermined balance number), then the
preselected signature 226 as well as the remainder of
35   the TP/PP will be retrieved. If the derived balance
number is not the same as the predetermined balance

number, the decryption will not yield the preselected
signature 226, and the program 18 will not be executed.
To throw a hacker further off guard, the application
software is preferably decrypted and re-encrypted on the
5   fly, i.e., as it is being run.

The predetermined balance number is suitably
encrypted in object code which is given to the publisher
to embed in the program 18, using principles commonly
known to those of ordinary skill in the art to which
10   this invention pertains. ^The publisher may not
therefore know the balance number. A series of
confusing processes are used, in accordance with
principles commonly known to those of ordinary skill in
the art to which this invention pertains, to deny access
15   to the predetermined balance number to the user or a
hacker.

Due to the pseudo-random nature of the
validation and activation codes, different validation
and activation numbers are obtained each time software
20   is installed on the same computer, and these numbers
disappear once the derived balance number is obtained.

In order to allow a potential customer to "try
and buy", the software 18 is preferably programmed to
allow activation then shut down (or provide a "nagging"
25   message periodically) after a number of uses and/or
number of days, as specified in the productprint 223.
This would allow software to be, for example, placed on
a bulletin board, downloaded, activated, and tried for a
period of time, as specified by the publisher, and then
30   be purchased during a brief telephone call to the
activation center. The publisher selects the "nag" or
"shutdown" version prior to package embedding.

Referring to Fig. 12, character 3 of the "try
& buy" indicator 223 is an indication of whether or not
35   the activated package has been purchased. If it has,
character 3 may, for example, be a "P" for "purchased."

If it is in "try" mode, character 3 may be a character
which indicates either "nag" (continue to operate when
the specified number of units of time and "tries" have
been used, but a reminder message on a regular basis) or

5   "no nag" (shut down when the specified number of units
of time or "tries" have been used). Character 3 also
specifies the unit of time, i.e., seconds, minutes,
hours, days, or months. Character 4 indicates the
number of units of time allowed, and character 5

10   indicates the number of tries allowed. If character 3
contains a "P," then characters 4 and 5 are random
characters. When the user purchases the software,
character 3 is changed to the "buy" character.

        Referring to Fig. 6, the following is an

15   alternative method for implementing the "network" and
"try & buy" features. Instead of listing a check
digit, D_5 is selected to provide information relative to
which of these features is to be implemented to be
passed from the user 40 to the operator 50 (or between

20   the respective computers) encoded within the digit D_5.
The software 18 is programmed to check for the "network"
and "try & buy" states and select a digit D_5 indicative
thereof. The possible states for each feature are "yes"
and "no." If the feature is not included as an option

25   for the type of software, it is "inactive." For
example, the digit D_5 may be selected as follows:

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Network state	Try & Buy state	D_5
No	No	1
No	Yes	2
Yes	No	3
Yes	Yes	4
Inactive	Inactive	0

Thus, D_5, in this embodiment would not be a check digit but would be a digit selected to represent the "network" and "try & buy" states.

When the operator 50 enters this digit D_5 as part of the validation number, the computer 60 is programmed to update its information database 63 appropriately to reflect the user's "network" and/or "try & buy" implementation.

As previously discussed, the pseudo-random encrypting of the validation and activation numbers and the random scattering of the thumbprint/productprint information provides numbers which appear to be meaningless and would not be expected to be decoded by a hacker even by the sophisticated programs and techniques currently in use. The maintenance of the program for generating the activation number at the activation center is inaccessible to the user and maintains secure that information which is needed to decode the activation number. The process of the present invention therefore does not require hiding of codes within the software.

Even if the hacker were successful in determining the derivation of the validation number and

the non-random activation number digits from the

validation number, he or she may still be stumped by a

failure to realize that the group of randomly generated

digits A_3, A_1, A_5 must have balance relative to the digits

5   of the validation number. Thus, a set of random digits

A_3, A_1, A_5 will not allow correct installation of the

software 18 unless the derived balance number is the

same as the predetermined balance number. This "balance

number" approach uniquely provides with the encrypted

10   number generation a two-piece approach which is not a

simple comparison which can be branched around by a

hacker. Thus, even if the hacker is able to

successfully break the code and generate an activation

number which will cause an encrypted TP/PP to be

15   written, his failure to select a set of random digits

which will provide the predetermined balance number

still prevents execution of the software since, upon

decryption, the preselected signature cannot be located.

Thus, although a method for authorizing the

20   use of a software package on a particular computer

system is provided by the present invention so as to be

virtually impossible, given the current state of the

art, to decode or reverse engineer, the process is made

convenient and easy for the software user, i.e., he or

25   she need only make a phone call and follow some easy

directions. With modem-to-modem communication, personal

communication with an activation center operator is not

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even required. Further, the unchanging and unique

nature of the computer characteristics on which

authorization is based allow the authorization process

to be reliable, i.e., an authorization on one machine

5   does not include others, and the user can be assured

that the authorization will not be lost just because the

computer characteristics may have changed since

authorization.

Although the invention has been described in

10   detail herein, it should be understood that the

invention can be embodied otherwise without departing

from the principles thereof, and such other embodiments

are meant to come within the scope of the present

invention as defined in the appended claims.

What is claimed is:

1. A method for authorizing use of software on a
computer comprising the steps of:

5   a.   programming the software to encrypt and
output to the user of a computer a first number derived
from information received by the software from the
computer of at least one characteristic of the computer
providing an unchangeable and unique identification of

10   the computer; and

          b.   Operating an other computer thereby
encrypting a second number derived from the first number
for input to the user's computer to allow use of the
software on the user's computer only if a predetermined

15   relationship exists between the first and second
numbers.

2.   A method according to claim 1 further
comprising selecting the at least one computer

20   characteristic from the group of computer
characteristics consisting of the serial number of the
disk drive, the BIOS data from ROM, the number of
sectors per track of the hard disk, the number of heads
of the hard disk, and the number of cylinders of the

25   hard disk.

3. A method according to claim 2 comprising programming the software to encrypt the first number from information as to all of said group of computer characteristics.

5

4. A method according to claim 2 comprising programming the software to encrypt the first number from information as to the BIOS data from ROM, the number of sectors per track of the hard disk, the number

10 of heads of the hard disk, and the number of cylinders of the hard disk.

5. A method according to claim 1 comprising securing information relative to the process for

15 encrypting the second number from access thereto by the user.

6. A method according to claim 1 comprising encrypting the second number pseudo-randomly.

20

7. A method according to claim 1 further comprising programming the software to encrypt the first number from the serial number of the hard disk.

25 8. A method according to claim 1 further comprising programming the software to provide an option to the user of the computer for trial of the software

for a specified period such that a new authorization for
use is required after the trial period is concluded.

9.   A method according to claim 1 further
5   comprising programming the software to allow the
authorization for use of the software to cover a
specified number of computers in a network.

10.   A method for authorizing use on a computer of
10   software which has been programmed to output to the user
of a computer a first number derived from at least one
characteristic of the computer, the method comprising
operating an other computer thereby encrypting for
inputting to the user's computer a second number derived
15   from the first number and including at least one
randomly generated digit which, when a predetermined
mathematical operation is performed on said at least one
randomly generated digit and on at least one of the
digits of the first number, yields in the user's
20   computer a derived balance number used to encrypt a
preselected signature in the user's computer whereby the
software may be used in the user's computer upon use of
a predetermined balance number equal to the derived
balance number to retrieve the preselected signature by
25   decryption thereof.

11. A method according to claim 10 further comprising selecting the predetermined balance number to be a prime number.

5   12. A method according to claim 10 comprising securing information relative to the process for encrypting the second number from access thereto by the user.

10   13. A method according to claim 10 comprising encrypting the second number pseudo-randomly.

14. A method for authorizing use of software on a computer comprising the steps of:

15   a.   programming the software to output to the user of a computer a first number derived from at least one characteristic of the computer; and

b.   operating an other computer thereby encrypting for inputting to the user's computer a second

20   number derived from the first number and including at least one randomly generated digit which, when a predetermined mathematical operation is performed on said at least one randomly generated digit and on at least one of the digits of the first number, yields in

25   the user's computer a derived balance number used to encrypt a preselected signature whereby the software may be used in the user's computer upon use of a

predetermined balance number equal to the derived

balance number to retrieve the preselected signature by

decryption thereof.

5   15.   A method according to claim 14 further

comprising programming the software to write information

including said preselected signature encrypted by the

derived balance number in the hard drive of the user's

computer.

10

16.   A method according to claim 15 further

comprising programming the software to scatter the bytes

of said encrypted information among randomly-generated

bytes.

15

17.   A method according to claim 14 further

comprising programming the software to write information

including said preselected signature encrypted by the

derived balance number in the root of the hard disk of

20   the user's computer, track 0 of the first cylinder of

the user's computer, and at least one location on the

diagnostic cylinder of the user's computer.

18.   A method according to claim 14 further

25   comprising selecting the at least one computer

characteristic from the group of computer

characteristics consisting of the serial number of the

- 40 -

hard disk, the BIOS data from ROM, the number of sectors

per track of the hard disk, the number of heads of the

hard disk, and the number of cylinders of the hard disk.

5   19.   A method according to claim 14 further

comprising selecting the at least one computer

characteristic to provide an unchangeable and unique

identification of the computer.

10   20.   A method according to claim 14 further

comprising programming the software to receive

information relative to the at least one computer

characteristic from the computer.

15   21.   A method according to claim 14 further

comprising programming the software to provide an option

to the user of the computer for trial of the software

for a specified period such that a new authorization for

use is required after the trial period is concluded.

20

            22.   A method according to claim 14 further

comprising programming the software to allow the

authorization for use of the software to cover a

specified number of computers in a network.

25

            23.   A method for authorizing use of software on a

computer comprising the steps of:

a.   programming the software to pseudo-randomly encrypt and output to the user of a computer a first number derived from information received by the software from the computer of at least

5 one characteristic of the computer;

b.   inserting the software in the computer and operating the computer to obtain the first number;

c.   operating another computer thereby pseudo-randomly encrypting a second number derived from

10 the first number and including at least one randomly-generated digit which, when a predetermined mathematical operation is performed on said at least one randomly generated digit and on at least one of the digits of the first number, yields a derived balance

15 number;

d.   inputting the second number to the user's computer;

e.   operating the user's computer thereby obtaining the derived balance number;

20 f.   operating the user's computer thereby assembling information including a preselected signature;

g.   operating the user's computer thereby encrypting the assembled information using the derived

25 balance number; and

h.   operating the user's computer thereby writing the encrypted assembled information to the

- 42 -

user's computer whereby the software may be used in the
user's computer upon use of the predetermined balance
number to retrieve the preselected signature by
decryption thereof.

5

24. A method according to claim 23 further
comprising connecting the user's computer and another
computer by modems for communication between the user's
computer and the another computer.

10

25. A method according to claim 23 further
comprising selecting the predetermined balance number to
be a prime number.

15   26. A method according to claim 23 further
comprising operating the user's computer thereby writing
the encrypted assembled information including the
preselected signature to at least one location in the
root of the hard disk drive, track 0 of the first

20 cylinder, and at least one location on the diagnostic
cylinder.

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FIG. 1

FIG. 2
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FIG. 3

USER COMPUTER

10

ACTIVATION COMPUTER

60

| COMPUTER CHARACTERISTICS | 42 |

44

| ENCRYTPED VALIDATION NUMBER |

56

52　　54

PH　　PH

| ENCRYPTED ACTIVATION NUMBER | 62 |

46

| ENTER ACTIVATION NUMBER |

52　　54

PH　　PH

56

| DERIVE BALANCE NUMBER | 64 |

65

| ENCRYPT TP/PP WITH BALANCE NUMBER |

USER　COMPUTER

10

| LOAD SOFTWARE PROGRAM | 120 |

| DECRYPT TP/PP WITH PREDETERMINED BALANCE NUMBER | 67 |

| EXECUTE SOFTWARE | 124 |

FIG. 4

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USER INSERTS SOFTWARE

USER SELECTS INSTALL OPTION

T.P. EXISTS FOR PRODUCT ? — YES

NO

"GREETINGS"

PROCEED WITH ACTIVATION ? — NO → EXIT

YES

CUSTOMER ID

PRODUCT ID

USER ENTERS PRODUCT SERIAL NO.

REQUESTS USER TO HAVE INFO. AVAILABLE

OBTAIN SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

65

VALIDATION NUMBER

USER REQUESTED TO CALL ACTIVATION CENTER

52 AND 54

ACTIVATION COMPUTER

ENTER VALIDATION NUMBER AND OTHER INFO

GENERATE ACTIVATION NUMBER

60

52 AND 54

ENTER AND WRITE ACTIVATION NO. (TP/PP)

PROCEED WITH INSTALLATION — NO → EXIT

YES

INSTALL

FIG. 5

START

PROGRAM
RETRIEVES
INTERNAL
CHARACTERISTIC
INFO.   70

GENERATE
5 RANDOM
DIGITS
R_1 TO R_5 78

R_1 TO R_5

REDUCE
INFO. TO
4 BYTES   72

CALCULATE
5 CHECK DIGITS
$D_1 \ldots D_5$ 74

PLACE
CHECK DIGITS
IN A
BUFFER   76

$D_1 \ldots D_5$

ADD
$R_1 + D_1 = C_1$
ETC.   80

$R_1 \ldots R_5$
$C_1 \ldots C_5$

ASSEMBLE
$R_1 \ldots R_5, C_1 \ldots C_5$ 82

CALCULATE
2 CHECK DIGITS
C_6, C_7 84

FIG. 6

ASSEMBLE
VALIDATION
NUMBER
$R_1 \ldots R_5, C_1 \ldots C_5, C_6, C_7$ 86

RETURN

SUBSTITUTE SHEET

START

90 — RECEIVE AND CONFIRM VALIDATION NUMBER $R_1 \ldots R_5, C_1 \ldots C_7$

92 — CALCULATE BAL. 1 (SUM OF DIGITS OF VALIDATION NUMBER)

94 — CALCULATE A_2, A_6 AND A_7

96 — GENERATE 3 RANDOM DIGITS a,b,c

98 — CALCULATE $d = a(b) + c$

100 — IF $d \geq$ BALANCE NUMBER $e = BAL.1 - d$ OTHERWISE, $e = BAL.1 + d$

102 — $e = $ BALANCE NUMBER?   NO

YES

104 — SET $a = A_3$ $b = A_1$ $c = A_5$

106 — BAL.1 $\geq$ BALANCE NUMBER?   YES

110 — SET $A_4 = $ RANDOM NUMBER 5 TO 9

NO

108 — SET $A_4 = $ RANDOM NUMBER 0 TO 4

112 — ASSEMBLE $A_1 \ldots A_7$

114 — CALCULATE CHECK DIGITS A_8 AND A_9

116 — DISPLAY ACTIVATION NUMBER $A_1 \ldots A_9$

RETURN

FIG. 7

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FIG. 8

USER "RUNS" THE SOFTWARE 120

119

"EXECUTABLE" CODE CHECKS FOR VALID TP/PP 122

VALID TP/PP EXISTS?

NO → 126 SYSTEM DISPLAYS: TO ACTIVATE, PLEASE INSERT ACTIVATION/ INSTALLATION DISKETTE OR CD ROM → AVAILABLE? NO → EXIT

YES

SOFTWARE EXECUTES 124

AVAILABLE? YES → ACTIVATION PROCESS 128

ASSEMBLE ACTIVATION NUMBER INCL. CC, $A_1 \ldots A_9$ 116

GENERATE CHECK DIGITS A_{10} AND A_{11} 250

SUM $A_1 \ldots A_{11}$ 252

GENERATE CHECK DIGITS A_{12} AND A_{13} BASED ON THE SUM 254

FINAL ACTIVATION NUMBER $A_1 \ldots A_{13}$ 256

FIG. 17

SUBSTITUTE SHEET

START

ENTER
ACTIVATION
NUMBER
$A_1 \ldots A_9$ — 130

CALCULATE
CHECK DIGITS
A'_8 AND A'_9 — 132

134

$A_8 = A'_8$
AND
$A_9 = A'_9$? — NO → ERROR RETURN

CALCULATE
A'_2, A'_6 AND A'_7 — 136

$A_2 A_6 A_7$
$= A'_2 A'_6 A'_7$? — NO → ERROR RETURN
138

EXTRACT
$A_1 A_3 A_5$ — 140

SET BAL.1 EQUAL
TO SUM OF DIGITS
OF VALIDATION
NUMBER — 142

SET BAL.2 EQUAL
TO $A_3(A_1) + A_5$ — 144

$A_4 \geq 5$? — YES → DERIVED BALANCE NUMBER = BAL.1 − BAL.2 — 146

NO — 148

DERIVED BALANCE
NUMBER =
BAL.1 + BAL.2

RETURN

FIG. 9

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FIG. 10

ASSEMBLE PP DATA — 170

172 — CALCULATE & STORE NEW CHECK SUMS FOR TP,PP,AND CLUSTER

ENCRYPT PP WITH TP KEY, XOR, AND ENCRYPT TP,PP WITH DERIVED BALANCE NO. — 174

176 — WRITE TP/PP TO COMPUTER

RETURN

161 — UPDATE TP FOR NEW PP

RUN RANDOM NO. GENERATOR FOR "POINTER" START POSITION — 163

START

DOES A TP EXIST? — 160

YES

NO

162 — RUN UNIQUE RANDOM NO. GENERATOR FOR "POINTER" PORTION OF TP

RUN NON-UNIQUE RANDOM NO. GEN. FOR LEFT PORTION OF TP AND 3 PP SECTORS — 164

166 — RUN RANDOM NO. GENERATOR FOR "POINTER" START POSITION

ASSEMBLE TP DATA — 168

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FIG. 11

FIG. 13

FIG. 14

FIG. 15

PRODUCT ID · TRY & BUY · NETWORK · CHECK SUM — 221

$1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11$

222   PP   223   224   225

FIG. 12

ASSEMBLE

1. CUST. ID INCL CC
2. PRODUCT ID INCL CC
3. PACKAGE SER. NO. INCL CC
4. PREL. VALIDATION NO. INCL CC

— 200

GENERATE CHECK DIGITS C_8 AND C_9 — 202

SUM CUST. ID . . . . . C_9 — 204

GENERATE CHECK DIGITS C_{10} AND C_{11} BASED ON THE SUM — 206

FINAL VALIDATION NUMBER $R_1 \ldots R_5, C_1 \ldots C_{11}$ — 208

FIG. 16

A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER
IPC 6   G06F1/00

According to International Patent Classification (IPC) or to both national classification and IPC

B. FIELDS SEARCHED

Minimum documentation searched (classification system followed by classification symbols)
IPC 6   G06F

Documentation searched other than minimum documentation to the extent that such documents are included in the fields searched

Electronic data base consulted during the international search (name of data base and, where practical, search terms used)

C. DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT

Category*	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
P,X	US,A,5 337 357 (CHOU ET AL) 9 August 1994	1,5,10, 12,14,20
	see abstract; figure 1	
	see column 2, line 57 - column 3, line 17	
P,Y		6,8,9, 13,21

X	US,A,4 796 220 (WOLFE) 3 January 1989 cited in the application see abstract; figures 1-3 see column 3, line 41 - column 4, line 48 see column 6, line 4 - column 8, line 68	1,2,5
A		8,13,15, 17,19, 21,24,26

	-/--	

[X] Further documents are listed in the continuation of box C.

[X] Patent family members are listed in annex.

Date of the actual completion of the international search	Date of mailing of the international search report
11 October 1995	1 8. 10. 95

Name and mailing address of the ISA	Authorized officer
European Patent Office, P.B. 5818 Patentlaan 2 NL - 2280 HV Rijswijk Tel. (+ 31-70) 340-2040, Tx. 31 651 epo nl, Fax (+ 31-70) 340-3016	Powell, D

	C.(Continuation) DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT	
Category *	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
Y	WO,A,94 07204 (UNILOC) 31 March 1994 see abstract; figure 8 see page 7, line 4 - page 8, line 28 see page 22, line 14 - page 23, line 9	6,8,13, 21
A	---	1,2
Y	US,A,5 023 907 (JOHNSON ET AL) 11 June 1991 see abstract; figure 2 see column 3, line 66 - column 5, line 41	9
A	-----	8,21

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